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Abstract
Distributed Ledger Technology (DLT) and its blockchain subclass are
emerging as a disruptive innovation with an expanding range of potential
applications. While DLT systems promise significant benefits to participants
and diverse industries, their use of cryptography and incentive models to
displace intermediaries and central authorities present significant challenges to
conventional models of institutionally-oriented governance. This is due to the
disintermediation of such governance bodies displacing the accountabilities
and decision rights such parties typically provide. This paper addresses the
emerging research question of how standards can address the assurances lost
by the displacement of conventional institutional governance mechanisms in
DLT systems.
Keywords: DLT, blockchain, Bitcoin, standards, scalable governance,
decentralization.
1 Introduction
Distributed ledger technology (DLT) systems such as Bitcoin claim to provide
transactional integrity without recourse to central governance authorities [1].
Atzori [2] describes this shift to decentralized governance as being driven
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by diminishing societal trust in central authorities and intermediaries. This
loss of trust was exacerbated by socio-economic events such as the 2008
Global Financial Crisis (GFC) and resulting social discord. DLT systems
such as Bitcoin facilitate decentralized governance using novel applications of
cryptography and incentives. Such DLT-enabled decentralized systems allow
participants to conduct trusted transactions between unknown parties without
recourse to intermediaries or authorities. This transition away from reliance
on trusted central parties presents significant challenges to conventional
mechanisms for governing systems.
Weill & Ross [3] define governance as the decision rights and accountabili-
ties to encourage behavior in the use of Information Technology (IT). Beck [4]
applies this definition of IT governance to the context of DLT governance,
placing additional emphasis on the role of aligned incentives between partic-
ipants and stakeholders of DLT systems. This system-enabled decentralized
governance approach enables a scalability of operation beyond the constraints
of institutionally-oriented governance [5]. While the promise of DLT-enabled
decentralized scalable governance is appealing to many, it presents chal-
lenges to participants who have relied on conventional institutionally-oriented
accountabilities and decision rights to manage risks and ensure equitable
outcomes. A key emerging research question is ‘What should be the role of
standards in supporting the DLT-enabled transition to scalable decentralized
governance?’
The scope of this paper is the role for standards in addressing the
challenges presented by decentrally-governed DLT systems. This paper is
organized as follows. Firstly, it discusses the challenges faced by conventional
institutionally-oriented governance. Secondly, it discusses the DLT-enabled
transition towards scalable decentralized governance. Thirdly, it discusses
the challenges introduced by decentrally-governed DLT systems. Finally, it
describes the role standards can play in addressing the emerging challenges
of decentralized governance.
2 Conventional, Institutionally-Oriented Governance
The ability to trust unknown others has been a distinguishing feature of human
society. In such situations, parties are unable to rely on the experience of
previous interactions and must overcome the perceived risk of engaging with
unknown others [6]. Modern society has industrialized the mitigation of such
risk through the endowment of ‘seals of approval’ from trusted centralized
institutions [7, p. 4]. The allocation of such seals through centrally-held
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public registers (or ‘ledgers’) has provided society with an efficient means
of recording changes of economic state transactions such as those relating
to property matters [8]. These centrally-held ledgers and the institutions that
oversee their operation have become a cornerstone of the modern industrial
state and centrally-assured governance. The centrally-assured governance of
trust, however, does not come without cost. Scott [9] notes that centrally-led
government processes often come at the price of overly simplistic standard-
ization that is not reflective of the inherent heterogeneity of society. At a small
scale, centrally-administered governance may have been efficient, however
when applied at scale across modern societies, such central governance can
be both expensive and unwieldy [8, 9].
As society has grown in complexity, institutions have evolved to more
efficiently enable societies to coordinate processes needed to support more
complex forms of economic activity and address the inefficiencies of state-
based resource allocation [10]. Institutions have further allowed the spe-
cialization and consolidation of resources needed for societal achievements
otherwise beyond the reach of individuals operating in isolation or ineffi-
cient state institutions [11]. Similar to the described weaknesses of states
however, the rise of institutions to orchestrate complex economic activity
has also come with costs. These include rent-seeking opportunism, costly
organizational hierarchies, the tendency to concentrate wealth and power,
and an unwieldiness of administration [8, 11]. These limitations have been
attributed to the outstripping the capacity of existing institutional mechanisms
to provide requisite social coordination, and have been exacerbated by public
perceptions of declining ethics and the emergence of technologies facilitating
increased information transparency and dissemination [12]. These weaknesses
have contributed to the increasing societal alienation from institutional entities
such as banks and regulators that have been conventionally entrusted with the
transfer of value in society [2, 9]. See Table 1.
Table 1 Challenges of conventional, centralized governance
Challenges of Conventional Institutionally-oriented
Governance Research
1 Inefficiency and unwieldiness of regulatory
enforcement
[8, 9]
2 Rent-seeking opportunism & concentrations of power [8, 11, 12]
3 Societal alienation [2, 12]




Emergence of DLT-enabled Scalable Decentralized
Governance
The decline of trust in central institutions has driven the pursuit for alternative
means of establishing trust among otherwise unknown parties [13]. DLT and
the subclass of blockchain technologies that underpin Bitcoin’s design have
received significant attention from industry and academia for their potential
to address concerns with conventional institutionally-based governance. The
use of technically-enacted scalable, decentralized governance affords DLT
participants relief from the friction of organizational interactions, allows
increased democratic coverage, and mitigates rent-seeking opportunism by
intermediaries [13–16]. Abramaowicz [17] notes the growing popularity
of Bitcoin and other DLT-based systems such as Ethereum demonstrate
a societal willingness to arrive at consensus on agreed economic states
without the presence of conventional central authorities or institutional
intermediaries.
As a technology of decentralization, DLT systems portend a more sophis-
ticated and efficient means of making complex decisions with integrity
and enabling scalable resource transfers among unknown participants [14].
Benkler [13] notes that DLT’s displacement of institutional intermediaries with
cryptographic assurances and incentives signifies a technological advance-
ment that addresses the underlying complexity and needs of today’s societies
while mitigating the inefficiencies and costs associated with state, firm
and market-based approaches to societal governance. By eliminating the
need for central authorities and intermediaries, distributed ledger systems
upend modern society’s dependence on these parties to provide assur-
ance and trust among unknown parties. Perhaps not surprisingly, DLT is
increasingly described as an institutional technology of decentralization [5].
See Figure 1.
From a governance perspective, a lasting legacy of Bitcoin and its under-
lying blockchain technology may be its ability to assure trust among unknown
parties without recourse to central authorities and reputable third-party
intermediaries. Yet despite their compelling possibilities, DLT systems
Figure 1 The evolution of minimizing participant opportunism in markets.
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themselves introduce their own governance challenges that require addressing
if they are to realise their full potential. Specifically, they introduce the question
‘Where does the buck stop when the entities in whom accountability and
decision rights conventionally vest are displaced by technology and their
replacements unclear?’
Challenges of Decentralized Governance
Decentralized governance that relies on the displacement of assurance-
providing central authorities and intermediaries introduces governance chal-
lenges that must be addressed if the shift to DLT-enabled governance is to
be succeed [18, 19]. These governance challenges include the concentration
of authority and decision-making power into unaccountable, often non-
transparent entities [2]; the rise of extra-judicial autonomous agents and
smart contracts for whom the sanctions and constraints of existing regulating
frameworks hold limited influence [15]; and the loss of points of regulatory
control resulting from the displacement of central authorities in regulated
environments [13]. Without effective mitigation, such challenges are likely to
impede the DLT-enabled transition to decentralized governance. See Table 2.
Emergence of Unaccountable, Oligarchic Governance Structures
Atzori [2] notes that DLT systems that eliminate central authorities and
intermediaries risk the emergence of a ‘techno-elite’ that lack formalized
legitimacy [2, p. 18]. In this case, powers invested in central authorities and
intermediaries such as central banks and financial institutions are replaced by
those that create and enforce the rules that govern a DLT system. In the case
of DLT systems such as Bitcoin, this power is concentrated among a handful
of parties including core developers and miners that are largely unaccountable
to Bitcoin participants [2, 20]. Perhaps ironically, Nakamoto’s stated intent of
to remove intermediaries has over time resulted in the investiture of power in
other arguably unaccountable entities.
Table 2 Challenges of decentrally-governed DLT-enabled systems
Governance Challenge Research
1 Emergence of unaccountable, oligarchic
governance structures
[2, 17, 20, 21]
2 Resistance of smart contracts and DAOs to
regulatory sanctions
[2, 15, 22]
3 Displacement of central control points [3, 13, 23]
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In Bitcoin, governance decision-making in Bitcoin is consolidated in the
form of core developers and mining entities who decide what code changes
to accept promote into the Bitcoin systems core protocols, and miners, who
decide which protocols to operate and execute transactions against [2, 17, 20].
This issue of Bitcoin’s powerful elite is a manifestation of a more general
observation that many peer-to-peer systems exhibit entrenched, unaccountable
concentrations of authority that frequently leads to oligarchic governance
structures [21]. As an early implementation of DLT, Bitcoin can be argued to
have demonstrated this tendency towards oligarchic consolidation of control
over governance mechanisms [2, 17]. Unlike intermediaries and central
authorities however, powerful participants in distributed ledger systems like
miners and core developers, are limited by lesser oversight and regulatory
constraints. This presents challenges to the stakeholders and participants to
distributed ledger systems, who have relatively limited recourse to hold the
decisions of such parties to account. While the early proponents of DLT
such as Bitcoin’s Satoshi Nakamoto and Ethereum’s Vitalik Buterin arguably
demonstrate socially conscience, what happens when the benevolent dictator
is replaced by one altogether less benign?
Efficacy of Jurisdictional Sanctions over DAOs and Smart Contracts
Among other capabilities enabled by the introduction of distributed ledger
systems is the growing deployment of self-executing smart contracts and
human-independent Decentralized Autonomous Organisations (DAOs) [15].
These constructs build on the core technologies underpinning Bitcoin and
extend them with artificial intelligence and self-executing code. The novel
nature of these capabilities presents challenges to the historical sanctions
regulators and governing authorities have used to regulate the activities of
individuals and organisations. DAOs portend the emergence of new economic
institutions that stretch the ability of existing legal and regulatory controls that
are grounded in the ability to sanction human actors or otherwise accountable
institutional entities [2, 15]. With such parties displaced however, conventional
governance oversight through sanctions and controls are less effective in their
ability to influence outcomes and behaviours. DAO operations could also be a
cause of harm to others, potentially leaving affected parties without effective
legal recourse due to the inability to ascertain culpable human actors [15]. Such
uncertainties present challenges for the decentralized governance inherent to
many DLT systems and warrant addressing before such governance can be
fully embraced.
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Smart contracts are self-enforcing code that execute autonomously on DLT
systems [2, 15]. The benefits of smart contracts are compelling. They offer
efficiencies in the form of reducing the cost of contracting and increase the
speed of contractual execution [15]. Kiviat [22] notes that smart contracts
in distributed ledger system contexts allow unknown parties to transact at
arm’s length, with reduced risk of fraud and costs of third-party enforcement.
In this manner smart contracts provide an efficient means of addressing the
costs and uncertainties associated with counterparty risks. Smart contracts
conversely introduce key governance challenges in the form of uncertainty
of their interoperability with existing legal and regulatory frameworks, and
the enforceability of legal rulings on their operation [15]. The uncertainty of
their interoperability with exiting existing governance frameworks presents a
further governance challenge that must be overcome if the benefits of DLT-
enabled smart contracts are to be fully realised.
Displacement of Central Control Points
Technology governance is often applied in institutional contexts to address
how technology decisions are prioritised, implemented and managed in
an efficient and effective manner. In these contexts, decision rights and
accountabilities are often invested in hierarchical power structures such as
executive management and boards [3, 23]. DLT systems disrupt the con-
ventional approach to hierarchical, centralized governance. By removing
intermediaries and central authorities however, DLT systems also remove key
control points relied on by regulators and broader DLT stakeholders to promote
governance accountability and standards [13]. Without recourse to regulating
intermediaries through licences, operational oversight, sanctions or otherwise
imparting controls through central authorities, where do regulators otherwise
target controls to assure participants and manage risks? The efficiency of
large institutional objects of regulatory attention risk being replaced with far
more distributed entities such as individual users, some of which may operate
outside the reach and jurisdiction of regulators.
Role of Standards in Enabling Scalable, Decentralized
Governance
Beck, Müller-Bloch & King [24] note the importance of standards in expand-
ing the adoption of DLT systems. While not addressing all of the challenges
introduced by decentrally-governed DLT systems, DLT standards will have
an important role to play in realising the benefits of scalable, decentralized
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Figure 2 The role of standards in addressing the challenges of DLT-enabled scalable
decentralized governance.
governance. Specifically, standards have three roles to play in addressing the
governance challenges attributable to the advent of scalable, decentralized
governance enabled by DLT systems. These are the alignment of incentives
across diverse DLT participant and stakeholders, the clarifying of decision
rights in DLT-enabled systems, and the establishment of accountabilities.
See Figure 2.
Aligning Incentives Across Diverse DLT Participants
Beck, Müller-Bloch & King [24] note the challenges of aligning incentives
among the diverse participants and stakeholders of DLT systems. Weill &
Ross [3] note the importance of aligning incentives across participants to
encourage behaviours that are conducive to the overall effectiveness of the
system. Standards can contribute to the alignment of incentives across stake-
holders by seeking to identify, define and declare the incentives of participants
and relevant stakeholders. Standards that promote the clarification of the
incentives operating in DLT systems allow participants and stakeholders to
identify the risks associated with specific DLT systems, and allow for informed
decisions in their joining and participation.Anjum, Sporny & Sill [25] note that
the clarification of such design attributes reduces the uncertainty of would-
be investors and participants in a DLT systems’ assurance, increasing the
likelihood of both DLT investment and adoption. This ability for standards
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to reduce the uncertainty associated with a DLT systems stands to increase
trust in these systems without recourse to intermediaries or central authorities.
Standards therefore have an important role to play in the displacement of
intermediaries and central authorities, a key attribute that [14] note as allowing
DLT-enabled governance to scale beyond the constraints of conventional,
institutionally-oriented governance.
Clarifying DLT Decision Rights
Standards can serve to provide certainty to DLT participants and stakeholders
in where decisions rights reside within a distributed system. In the context
of IT governance, [3] note the importance of decision rights in clarifying
whom can propose key governance decisions and how such decisions can be
implemented. In DLT systems, these decision rights encompass various key
decisions, including determining what the consensus rules are that govern
the making of DLT decisions and performance of key functions including
participant voting, forking, and conflict resolution.
Where uncertainty exists in how such decisions can be made, this affects
the overall confidence of participants in the use of the system [25]. Such
uncertainty risks impeding the early adoption of DLT systems by participants,
and lack of investment decisions by investors and existing organisations.
Similarly, for decisions relating to the use and adoption of smart contexts, [19]
note the lack of clarity regarding the enforcement of smart contract rights may
restrict their application to simple agreements, limiting the benefits afforded
by their fuller adoption.
In facing the uncertainties associated with the lack of identified author-
ities, explicit governing bodies and interoperability of DLT systems with
existing legal and regulatory frameworks, standards are well placed to clarify
whom can propose governance decisions and how such decisions should be
made [19]. Beck, Müller-Bloch & King [24] note that DLT decisions are
increasingly dependent on technical enactment due to the need to scale
decisions across larger number of decentralized participants and the frequent
lack of institutions that otherwise conventionally hold such decision rights. In
this case, standards are likely to encourage the investment certainty required
to build more scalable technically-enactable decision rights for DLT systems,
a foundation necessary for the realization of scalable governance.
Establishing DLT Accountabilities
In the context of DLT systems, Beck, Müller-Bloch and King [24] note
the absence of central authorities and intermediaries as presenting a DLT
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governance challenge in the form of uncertainty as to where accountabili-
ties reside. This uncertainty contributes to the risks stakeholders including
regulators, investors and would-be DLT participants must incorporate into
decisions on how to regulate, or whether to invest in or join a DLT system.
For DLT systems, a lack of clarity of DLT system accountabilities can be
further exacerbated by the presence of non-corporeal entities such as DAOs
and functions such as smart contracts. Who would bear accountability for a
DAO meeting its obligations in a jurisdiction otherwise requiring institutional
disclosure of ownership and executive management positions?
Standards could address such concerns by requiring that compliant DLT-
enabled systems declare where accountabilities for key DLT functions and
governance decisions rights reside. This would inform decisions by regulators,
potential investors and participants in DLT-enabled systems. The clarification
of accountabilities for DLT-enabled multi-party supply chain and trade finance
systems would in particular reduce uncertainty risk for decision makers. In
these scenarios standards would be useful in clarifying mutual accountabil-
ities, encouraging trust and building confidence which would otherwise be
provided by trusted intermediaries and central authorities [19]. Such benefits
of standards would be particularly important to build confidence and adoption
for DLT systems that transfer responsibility from one party to another across
organisational and potentially jurisdictional boundaries. Mainelli & Mills [19]
note that in these cases standards would encourage investor confidence and
participant adoption by clarifying how the accountabilities of DLT-enabled
systems would co-exist and interoperate with the accountabilities associated
with existing, legacy systems. Anjum, Sporny & Sill [25] note this would be
beneficial in early-stage DLT investment in determining the legal responsi-
bilities of existing governing authorities that invest and participate in DLT
systems. By example, organisationally-operated DLT systems could receive
guidance and certainty from standards on how the responsibilities of boards
and executive management are affected by an organisation’s trade participation
using DLT-enabled systems.
Is it the Right Time for Standards?
A common argument observed against the release of DLT standards is that
the release of such standards would be premature considering the relative
immaturity of its underlying technology [19, 26]. Such arguments are largely
based on the premise that the introduction of purportedly premature standards
would stifle innovation or force adherence to sub-optimal technical designs.
Given that Bitcoin is now a decade old and many of its underlying technical
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foundations older, the case to delay standards on grounds of technical immatu-
rity wears increasingly thin. This coupled with the significant amounts of value
are being transacted over DLT systems such as Bitcoin suggests the benefits of
standards-supported certainty is growing. The benefits of releasing standards
now are amplified by calls of developers and investors for standards to
encourage increased DLT investment, adoption and regulatory certainty – each
essential ingredients for the transition to scalable, decentralized governance.
Conclusion
This paper examined how DLT systems supplant the role of increasingly
distrusted institutions and central authorities by disrupting conventional
institutionally-oriented governance. The displacement of intermediaries and
central authorities introduces its own governance challenges. These include
the emergence of unaccountable, oligarchic power structures, the difficulty of
aligning incentives across diverse DLT participants and stakeholders, lack of
clarity of DLT decision rights, and the disruptions to institutionally-oriented
governance caused by the displacement of conventional governance control
points such as institutional boards and executive management. This paper
identifies specific roles that standards can play in addressing these governance
challenges and contends the argument to delay DLT standards diminishes as
the value of DLT-facilitated transactions rise and the demand for standards
from investors, DLT participants and regulators grows.
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